Two years into President Gustavo Petro’s administration, Total Peace, the Colombian government’s flagship policy to end the country’s civil conflict, analysis suggests that criminal groups have grown in strength while peace remains a distant prospect.
A report published by the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Fundación Paz & Reconciliación – PARES), a think tank that focuses on Colombia’s armed conflict, found that the policy had advanced little in achieving its aim of the complete demobilization of the country’s warring factions and criminal groups.
At the beginning of August, the ceasefire between the Petro administration and the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the country’s last guerrilla group, expired, plunging an already fragile Total Peace process into further doubt. Negotiations with this group lie at the heart of the Total Peace strategy.
Talks have also broken down with the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), one of the dissident structures that make up the ex-FARC mafia, while another, the Second Marquetalia, began talks with the government on July 24.
The Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), also known as the Gulf Clan, have consolidated themselves as the most important drug trafficking organization in the country and have just agreed to talks with the government. However, as a nonpolitical actor, the talks are taking place under a different legal framework
As challenges continue, InSight Crime spoke with Laura Bonilla, deputy director of PARES, about their report’s findings that the evolution of Colombia’s illegal armed groups made negotiation more difficult.
InSight Crime (IC): How has violence evolved and illegal groups expanded during Total Peace?
Laura Bonilla (LB): Total Peace has been blamed for a lot of this expansion, only some of which is true.
The idea of the negotiations generated the assumption that sitting down to talk with armed groups meant the immediate reduction of violence. That assumption might have been true in previous periods of the armed conflict, with groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), which had the capacity to reduce violence. But that is not the scenario today.
The growth of armed groups in this cycle of violence started in 2018, peaked between 2020 and 2022, and continued to grow in 2023, though not as fast.
The EMC expanded the most in 2023, while the ELN grew at a slower rate. The EMC’s fronts have mainly expanded since 2018, which means before the beginning of Total Peace. But Total Peace did give them an incentive to unify before the negotiations began, and they accelerated that unification as a result.
The ELN, on the other hand, is a very traditional guerrilla with a cohesive and more consolidated structure, that has patterns of self-restraint, so it crosses fewer red lines.
The ceasefires were effective in some places, reducing the level of violence, especially in places where only the armed group and the army were present. Where do they not work? In places where there are disputes for territorial control between several illegal groups. There, the role of the public forces, and therefore the influence of ceasefires, is not as high.
IC: The report says the EMC extended its territorial control by 25%, the AGC by 17%, and the ELN and Second Marquetalia to lesser extents. What is behind this evolution of illegal groups in the country?
LB: The EMC abused the state’s offer during negotiations. The EMC’s strengthening is also influenced by the creation of the group, when many structures were brought together trying to create a General Staff. But now, for example, there are two General Staffs, following the division within the group between the wing of “Iván Mordisco” and the wing of Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá”. The group structure wasn’t large, but it looked big because all the fronts were united under one umbrella. It is very possible that each front has been expanding equally.
The AGC has been growing since 2008. It has been formed, shaped, had internal conflict, and won conflicts. It is now in the process of expanding. It has no reason to sit down with the state and talk.
Two questions arise with this: Is it possible to win the war against the AGC in economic terms? With drug trafficking we have doubts, but what about winning the war against the other criminal economies in which the AGC participates, such as illegal mining, human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and extortion? Winning this war is complicated because we don’t know how to fight criminal structures like the AGC, which is an entity focused on financial, not political, ends. This is one of the biggest challenges.
I believe that the Second Marquetalia is willing to surrender their weapons in exchange for a good reception from civil society and political representation. Negotiations with the group are complicated by the legal framework because it has already abandoned peace talks once before.
The ELN is more traditional in its approach. It is a complicated group, but one could say that they aspire to have changes on a national level, they have agendas on big issues in the context of the peace process.
IC: Why are crimes like extortion increasing?
LB: One reason is the formation of Colombia’s illegal armed groups. Not all members of the groups have access to the same economic opportunities, and the lower levels must seek resources to expand and survive.
A second reason may be that the army being more active in interdicting cocaine is causing buyers to move to less complicated markets such as Ecuador or Bolivia. That affects groups’ income, and that means groups seek other sources of financing.
Third, there is a proliferation of criminal gangs and extortion has become a very attractive new business for these types of structures.
IC: How do you see Total Peace unfolding in the future, and what challenges remain for the project?
LB: The government should plan a better route to peace, deciding where it needs to do and where it needs to put the effort to achieve it. The name Total Peace can be kept, but in practice, peace will only be found in certain regions.
Finally, the improvement of the security situation does not depend solely on armed groups. The state also needs to provide a good policy to protect human rights.
*This interview was edited for clarity and brevity.
Feature image: A group of soldiers from the EMC stand together in Colombia’s Caquetá department in February 2024. Credit: Ernesto Guzmán/EFE.
